Houthi advance in Yemen is about more than just the Red Sea

Live Click here to searchsearchSign upEDITOR'S ANALYSISNews|HouthisHouthi advance in Yemen is about more than just the Red SeaHouthis were already able to disrupt shipping – their advance consolidates that power, and exposes Yemeni government weakness.

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Houthis controlam rota marítima chave após ganhos ao longo da costa do Mar Vermelho do Iêmen.

O grupo tem sido capaz de ameaçar a rota marítima de vital importância, mas tem feito isso desde 2023. Esta nova vitória consolida esse controle, provando que o governo do Iêmen não está atualmente em posição de derrotá‑los.

The prior Houthi control over the northern section of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline, including the major port city of Hodeidah, has allowed the Iran-allied rebel group, for years, to first attack shipping linked to Israel and the United States – and then, in recent months, Saudi Arabian-linked vessels.

That control also damaged the global economy. Long before the US war with Iran and the transformation of the Strait of Hormuz into a tool to throttle international trade, Houthi attacks around Yemen had turned Bab al-Mandeb into a similar weapon, and led to bombing campaigns against the Houthis by the US, the United Kingdom, and Israel.

Houthi officials themselves have emphasised this, with one leading official, Abdulqader al-Murtada, saying earlier this week that the group did “not need control over Bab al-Mandeb, for the blockade [on Saudi ships] is already in place”.

Al-Murtada poderia apontar navios sauditas que têm evitado o Estreito de Bab al-Mandeb desde que os Houthis começaram a atacá‑los em julho, mesmo antes de seu último progresso.

However, the Houthi lightning advance makes it even easier for the group to disrupt shipping. They now have access to the Red Sea’s narrow entry point and several islands in it, allowing them to use shorter-range weapons and more easily reach vessels they want to attack and board, as well as potentially using sea mines to further restrict shipping.

The increase in the Houthi ability to target shipping – even with the caveats outlined above – does have an impact on market sentiment. Oil prices have increased as traders price in the ability for Iran and its allies to disrupt shipping in Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, the two maritime chokepoints of the southern Arabian Peninsula.

No entanto, as consequências desse avanço não se limitam apenas à maior capacidade dos Houthis de atacar embarcações, mas também à realidade crescente de que o problema dos Houthis no Mar Vermelho não está desaparecendo.

For months, after Saudi Arabia backed a Yemeni government campaign against southern Yemeni separatist forces earlier this year, the mood had shifted in the country’s anti-Houthi camp.

A percepção era de que o governo yemenita, liderado pelo Conselho de Liderança Presidencial, finalmente havia se organizado. O presidente Rashad al‑Alimi repetidamente falou sobre uma cadeia de comando militar unificada, permitindo que o exército superasse as divisões atribuídas à sua incapacidade de derrotar os Houthis.

Yemeni and Saudi officials had hinted at an anti-Houthi campaign all year. The Red Sea coastline was a possible location: the largely flat geography suited the government, allowing Saudi Arabia to effectively use its air power; much of the population is not made up of the Houthis’ traditional support base; and prior Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping meant that there would likely be international buy-in for such a campaign.

The seizure of the Red Sea coastline has broken all of those narratives.

The momentum the Yemeni government thought it had, even at the start of this week when it claimed advances in al-Jawf, to the east of the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa, is now gone.

Depois de meses de projeção de unidade, o campo anti‑houthi do Iêmen volta a se voltar contra si mesmo, trocando acusações de culpa pela derrota.

The message the Houthis have for Saudi Arabia is clear: ‘Your partners in Yemen can’t defeat us.’.

Portanto, o argumento potencial dos Houthis é que a Arábia Saudita deve fazer um acordo com eles e concordar com seus termos, incluindo o financiamento de salários do setor público por Riyadh, acesso à renda das reservas de petróleo e gás do Iêmen e nenhuma restrição sobre voos e navegação para portos controlados pelos Houthis.

The Houthis have an incentive to lock in their gains and raise the cost of escalation before Saudi-backed Yemeni forces can reorganise.

Their attacks on Saudi Arabia, escalating in the past week, have been damaging, and the group is promising more if Riyadh increases its military support for the Yemeni government.

The risk of any such intervention is clearly there for Saudi Arabia. But so is the risk of inaction. The Houthis have repeatedly demanded more concessions when they were in positions of strength.

Com a guerra no Iêmen ainda não resolvida, os Houthis podem decidir escalar novamente no futuro, mesmo que um acordo seja firmado agora.

And so, policymakers in Riyadh could determine that it makes more sense to make a concerted effort to deal with the problem head-on now, rather than allow it to fester into the future.

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