Al-Qaida and IS-linked violence in Africa’s Sahel belt set to hit record levels this year

Three armed al-Shabaab fighters in Mogadishu, Somalia in 2008 – the al-Qaida-linked group is one of Africa’s deadliest. Photograph: Farah Abdi Warsameh/APView image in fullscreenThree armed al-Shabaab fighters in Mogadishu, Somalia in 2008 – the al-Qaida-linked group is one of Africa’s deadliest.

Fotografia: Farah Abdi Warsameh/APAfricaAl-Qaida e violência ligada ao IS no cinturão do Sahel da África devem atingir níveis recordes este ano. Vinte e cinco anos após o 11 de setembro, dados compilados por monitor de conflitos destacam como a região do Sahel se tornou centro do terror islâmico.

Prefer the Guardian on GoogleIslamist extremist violence in Africa’s Sahel region is set to reach historic highs after a series of sweeping offensives by groups linked to al-Qaida and Islamic State, according to new figures compiled by the conflict monitor Acled.

As the US marks the 25th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks launched by al-Qaida against targets in Washington and New York, the statistics underline the continued expansion of the veteran organisation in parts of Africa – in stark contrast with its relative weakness elsewhere.

Compiled by Acled, which stands for Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, the statistics focus on the centre of Islamic militancy in three countries – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – which together comprise a huge and hotly contested zone at the heart of the strategic Sahel region.

De acordo com a respeitada organização sem fins lucrativos, os incidentes de violência com grupos jihadistas presentes nos três países aumentaram de 63 em 2016 para 2.

So far this year, 2,145 events have already been logged. If current trends continue in coming months, an annual total of well over 3,000 events appears likely.

Embora o total de mortes por terrorismo globalmente tenha caído para o nível mais baixo desde 2008, as mortes no Sahel aumentaram drasticamente.

View image in fullscreenScreenshot of a video filmed by JNIM fighters in Mansila, Burkina Faso, in 2024. In April, a joint offensive in Mali launched by the al-Qaida-linked group Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Tuareg-dominated rebel group Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) targeted strategic towns, government forces and their Russian auxiliaries with ambushes, car bombs, drones and raids, inflicting significant casualties.

Mali’s defence minister died in a suicide attack on his residence in the garrison town of Kati, 9 miles north-west of the capital, Bamako, and the head of military intelligence was killed.

Outros ataques atingiram o aeroporto internacional do Mali, enquanto os rebeldes tomaram o controle da estratégica cidade de Kidal, antiga fortaleza da FLA, após soldados fugirem e uma força de mercenários russos se renderam.

The defeat reversed a key symbolic victory won by the junta in Mali three years ago.

Since then, JNIM has continued to expand areas under its control in Mali, killing more soldiers and Russian mercenaries in recent weeks, and broadening its operations in some neighbouring countries.

Grande parte da violência envolve combates com grupos rivais. O conflito também incluiu múltiplos assassinatos por forças armadas governamentais e mercenários russos.

View image in fullscreenThree Russian mercenaries, on right, in northern Mali. Photograph: French Army/APIn Burkina Faso, JNIM has claimed more than 130 attacks in 2026, striking closer to Ouagadougou, the capital.

No Níger, o grupo alegou pelo menos 17 ataques, mas permaneceu significativamente menos ativo que seu rival, o Estado Islâmico no Grande Saara, segundo um recente relatório das Nações Unidas baseado em inteligência fornecida pelos Estados membros.

Experts said JNIM had distanced itself from al-Qaida’s historic objectives of striking the US and its allies.

Read more“In the Sahel, Islamic State and al-Qaida now command big areas but these are very localised groups. Not a single attack in Europe or the US has been planned in the Sahel,” said Ulf Laessing, a senior analyst at the Konrad Adenauer foundation in Berlin.

O outro principal grupo na África subsaariana com ligações ao al-Qaida é o al-Shabaab, que tem dominado grande parte das áreas rurais da Somália há muitos anos.

Grupos militantes ligados de forma frouxa ao IS estão ativos na República Democrática do Congo, Moçambique, Chade e Nigéria, onde foram alvo de ataques aéreos dos US no ano passado.

The continuing expansion in sub-Saharan Africa has been welcomed in al-Qaida’s propaganda, but experts point out the continent barely featured in the group’s strategic planning until recent years.

View image in fullscreenA Somali police officer at the site of an al-Shabaab attack in Mogadishu in 2023. Photograph: Feisal Omar/ReutersThough sectarian and ethnic conflict, bitter competition over resources, poor governance, endemic instability and other factors make Africa a fertile ground for Islamic militant recruiters, territory in places like Mali and Somalia has major limitations as a base for campaigns elsewhere in the world or for long-range terrorist attacks.

At its peak in the years after the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaida affiliates posed a significant threat to authorities across much of the Middle East, with thousands convinced by the group’s call for a global uprising against the US, Israel and local regimes.

Al-Qaeda também foi capaz de inspirar e dirigir uma série de ataques letais na Europa que mataram centenas.

However, the recent UN report described al-Qaida senior leadership as “marginalised” and noted that the group’s capability and intent to conduct external operations remained “unclear”.

Analistas apontam que não houve declaração formal de um sucessor de Ayman al‑Zawahiri, o veterano militante egípcio morto em Cabul pelos EUA em 2022.

View image in fullscreenThere has been no declaration of who will succeed Ayman al-Zawahiri, seen here with Osama bin Laden in 2001, as al-Qaida leader since his death in 2022.

Photograph: Daily Dawn/ReutersInstead, the de facto leader is believed to be 66-year-old Saif al-Adel, who is thought to have been in Iran since 2002 and has yet to make any public statement.

Outros líderes provavelmente estão baseados no Afeganistão, onde o grupo conseguiu reconstruir uma infraestrutura limitada, segundo serviços de inteligência ocidentais.

The most potent al-Qaida affiliate outside Africa is the Yemen-based Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which the UN report described as “the vanguard of the global al-Qaida movement” and one of the few affiliates committed to continuing al-Qaida’s decades-old campaign against the US.

In May, AQAP’s media channels released a new video calling on Muslims in Europe and the US to carry out local attacks and to fight on “behalf of the [Islamic community] in any way possible”.

Mas, apesar de a AQAP continuar mantendo cerca de 2. 000 combatentes, principalmente arraigados nas montanhas entre Abyan e Shabwa, a atividade do grupo caiu cerca de 70%, de 63 eventos nos primeiros sete meses de 2025 para 19 no mesmo período de 2026, segundo a Acled.

Some analysts have contrasted the high numbers of militants currently mobilised by groups such as JNIM and al-Shabaab, which number in the tens of thousands, with the much more limited manpower available to al-Qaida before the 9/11 attacks.

Others stress the very different intentions and capabilities of the group now and 25 years ago.