What did US intelligence know before the 9/11 attacks?

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CIA Director John Ratcliffe called the release of the documents “an act of exceptional transparency”. This is the agency’s largest-ever release of presidential daily briefs, the classified intelligence summaries written for the president and his most senior officials.

Os arquivos abrangem o período de fevereiro de 1998 a 12 de setembro de 2001 – o dia após os ataques mortais em Nova York e Washington, DC – e revelam como a CIA rastreou os movimentos de bin Laden, seu financiamento e suas redes dentro dos EUA e no exterior.

In one, a briefer warns that the group behind that year’s East Africa embassy bombings “may fly an explosive-packed airplane into a US city”.

Another notes that some in bin Laden’s network had received hijack training. Others describe his hunt for materials to build a radioactive “dirty bomb”.

The documents add little new information about how the attacks were planned, but they do offer a paper trail of accumulating warnings.

Here’s a breakdown of what is in them.

Seventy-one presidential daily briefs spanning the period from February 1998 to September 2001. These are the highly classified intelligence summaries prepared for the president and the government’s most senior officials.

Os documentos totalizam 101 páginas, sendo o mais antigo, intitulado Terrorists seeking WMD capability, datado de 13 de fevereiro de 1998.

The last, Situation Report: Bin Laden’s Tracks, is dated September 12, 2001, the day after the attacks.

In between are briefs on the Taliban’s refusal to give bin Laden up, his hunt for chemical, biological and radiological weapons, his financing, and repeated warnings that he intended to strike inside the US.

Many pages are redacted to protect sources.

O que a inteligência dos EUA sabia sobre a Al-Qaeda antes do 11 de setembro

Um grande negócio, e desde bem cedo.

Os resumos mostram que os analistas estavam rastreando os movimentos de bin Laden, o sistema de apoio ao seu redor, sua rede dentro dos EUA e no exterior, e como suas operações eram financiadas.

Some of the warnings laid out in the presidential briefs were strikingly specific. In September 1998, three years before the attacks, a briefer wrote that bin Laden’s “preferred option is to strike the US on its own soil in Washington”.

Analysts also noted his interest in unconventional weapons: Chemical, biological, and radiological.

Em junho de 1999, os relatórios incluíam relatos de que os operativos de bin Laden haviam experimentado com explosivos para “aumentar sua produção de energia”, como parte de uma busca por chamados “bombas sujas”.

An April 1998 brief found there was no evidence the Taliban intended to hand bin Laden over, describing him as their “guest” and noting that “gratitude for his assistance during the Soviet occupation” of Afghanistan between December 1979 and February 1989 left them “reluctant to alienate him by monitoring or controlling his activities”.

How many warnings of an attack was the president given.

The warnings weren’t just occasional; they kept coming.

Em 1998, 1999 e 2000, houve vários relatórios, incluindo um intitulado Terrorismo: Extremistas de Bin Laden Planejando Ataques.

Then in 2001, when George W Bush took over as president from Bill Clinton, the frequency increased, and by the summer the language was increasingly alarming, with one briefing simply titled: Bin Laden Determined To Strike in US.

Os oficiais sabiam que aviões poderiam ser usados em um ataque.

A brief dated September 10 that year, titled Bin Ladin’s Location and Intentions, recorded his stated preference for striking Washington, then added that the group behind that summer’s East Africa US embassy bombings “may fly an explosive-packed airplane into a US city”.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had quickly determined that those attacks had been carried out by al-Qaeda.

The same memo cautioned that intelligence gave “no conclusive information” on his intentions for future attacks.

That December, another brief described conspirators who “had evaded security checks during a recent trial run at an unidentified New York airport”, and noted that “some members of the Bin Laden network have received hijack training.”.

Esse briefing, datado de 4 de dezembro de 1998, foi intitulado Bin Laden Preparing To Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks.

Does this prove the US government knew 9/11 was coming.

Não. Pode levantar questões sérias sobre por que não parecia estar mais preparado, mas não mostra nenhuma evidência de falta de vontade por parte do governo em prevenir um ataque.

The newly released material reinforces the explanation that intelligence agencies had many pieces of the puzzle but had failed to assemble them into a clear picture in time.

There is no evidence at all to support conspiracy theories about government involvement or that government officials had prior knowledge of the attacks, which have grown in popularity in the US.

Não, alguns dos briefings já foram divulgados antes.

The two best-known items were already out. The August 6, 2001 brief, Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US, was declassified in 2004 at the 9/11 Commission’s request.

Os resultados mais amplos também são conhecidos, incluindo que a inteligência dos EUA havia rastreado as intenções de bin Laden por anos, que aviões foram apresentados na reportagem, e que nada disso identificou o horário, local, método ou alvos do eventual plano.

The 9/11 Commission set all of this out more than two decades ago.

The release adds the underlying documents, in the briefers’ own words, rather than a commission summary.